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INTRODUCTION

It is with great pleasure that I introduce three articles originally
presented at a "Private Law and Public Interest" panel that I modert Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. B.A., 1988,
Williams College; J.D., 1992, University of Denver College of Law; LL.M., 1997, Temple University School of Law. I would like to thank Professors David Barnes, David
Nadvorney, and Frank Snyder for their insightful comments and suggestions on an
earlier draft. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the panel, as well as the
Texas Wesleyan Law Review and the law faculty of the University of Gloucestershire
for sponsoring such a wonderful event. Finally, I must thank my research assistant,
Rebecca Barnhart, for her tireless and invaluable assistance with all aspects of this
Article.
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ated during a symposium celebrating the 150th Anniversary of Hadley
v. Baxendale. The articles approach a broad array of issues ranging
from protection of the wetlands to copyright law to modern trends in
technology-related legislation. While each seemingly addresses radically different areas of the law, the articles share common ground in
one distinct way: using different contextual settings, each article explores the role of private contract law in furthering the public good.
In her article, A Common Tragedy: The Breach of Promises to Benefit the Public Commons and the Enforceability Problem, Professor
Irma Russell examines the use of private contract law to benefit the
public commons, and specifically our nation's wetlands.' She argues
that contractual promises made to the public, such as a promise to
jumpstart a wetland, are often unenforced because citizens who might
be harmed by a breach would incur enforcement costs disproportionate to the limited benefits received from enforcement, and enforcement mechanisms are "diluted in the context of individual action to
address breaches to the public trust. '
Panelist Leah Theriault discusses the extent to which non-negotiated mass market licenses are able to circumvent the Copyright Act.
She posits that through private contract, copyright owners are often
able to protect subject matter which copyright law explicitly refuses to
protect. She suggests that the problem persists not because of the preemption provision of the Copyright Act, but rather because of the
loose application of traditional contract law of offer, acceptance, and
mutual assent to protect the flow of goods and services in the commercial marketplace.
Finally, Courtney Perry's article, My Kingdom for a Horse: Reining
in Runaway Legislation from Software to Spain, addresses the
problems that occur when legislatures rush to codify developing fields
of law, without considering the actual practices in the developing marketplace.3 She points to the success of the U.C.C., which developed
rules to reflect the common practices among merchants, and cautions
legislatures against deviating too far from commercial norms.
Each of the three articles emphasizes the importance modern contract law places on the enforcement of commercial contracts. Today,
contract law is a viable and innovative tool to protect commercial
rights, eagerly inventing novel approaches to issues with an economic
or commercial component.4 For example, contracts of adhesion are
often enforced, despite the lack of true assent, in recognition of the
1. Irma Russell, A Common Tragedy: The Breach of Promises To Benefit the
Public Commons and the Enforceability Problem, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 557
(2005).
2. Id. at 575.
3. Courtney Lytle Perry, My Kingdom for a Horse: Reining in Runaway Legislation from Software to Spam, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 523 (2005).
4. U.C.C. Article 2 was specifically developed to provide flexibility for contracts
in a commercial context. See infra Part III.A.
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realities of modern commerce, in which most buyers and sellers never
meet and most signatories do not read the agreements they sign.5 But
its use for the protection of third parties and the public is not always
equally pursued, resulting in less attention to non-economic issues and
losses.6
Using the examples posed by the panelists, this Article explores the
limitations on the ability of contract law to deal with the protection of
third parties and the public. This limitation is manifested in two distinct ways: (1) Commercial contracts are typically enforced without
regard to the negative impact they may have on the public;7 and (2)
although some courts appear willing to stretch the bounds of the law
to ensure contracts are enforced in commercial contexts, 8 there has
been substantially less motivation to enforce contracts for the public
good.9 Accordingly, Part III will discuss the innovative and flexible
nature of the common law of contracts as it applies to protecting commercial interests and players and its concomitant insensitivity toward
the public interest. Part IV will address the inadequacy of contract
law as a means of protecting public and non-economic interests.

II.

SHIFTING EMPHASIS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON
LAW OF CONTRACTS

The common law has always been associated with limited government in general and specifically with few government restrictions on
individual economic autonomy. 10 "English common law developed as
it did because landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a system of
law that would provide strong protections for property and contract
rights and limit the Crown's ability to interfere in markets."'1 It follows that common-law systems are typically viewed as "productive of
'12
greater economic growth.
In the common-law tradition, modern contract law has shown primary concern for protection of contract rights and economic freedom,13 with less attention typically given to social institutions and
nontraditional subject areas such as protection of employees, the envi5. See infra Part III.A.1.

6. See infra Parts II.B, IV.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.A.

9. See infra Part IV.
10. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2001) [hereinafter Mahoney, Common Law].
11. Id. at 504.
12. Gillian K. Hadfield, Contract Law Is Not Enough: The Many Legal Institutions
That Support ContractualCommitments, University of Southern California School of
Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper 3 at 5 (2004), available at http://
lawweb.usc.edu/cleo/working-papers/cleo/documents/C04 5-paper.pdf (last visited
January 29, 2005) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
13. Mahoney, Common Law, supra note 10, at 508.
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ronment or public health and welfare. 14 Notably, the drive for free
contracting did not come in the sixteenth century when the Crown's
power was at its zenith or at the point when the powers of the nobility
and the gentry were at their peak in the eighteenth century. Rather,
the push came in the nineteenth century, when the commercial classes
began to take a powerful role in society. 15 Whereas contract law in
the eighteenth century expressed hostility "to the interests of commercial classes,"' 6 by inquiring into the fairness of the exchange, nineteenth century contract law, spurred by the fluctuating nature of the
modern market economy, rejected the premise that fairness could be
objectively measured.' 7 At the same time, courts moved away from
reflecting the legal and ethical mores of small businesspeople and
came to represent the interests of larger commercial
farmers and
18

interests.

Nineteenth century courts embraced the "will theory" of contract,
which relied on offer, acceptance, and consideration to find a valid
14. Friedrich Hayek argued that "English and French concepts of law stemmed
from English and French models of liberty, the first (derived from Locke and Hume)
emphasizing the individual's freedom to pursue individual ends and the second (derived from Hobbes and Rousseau) emphasizing the government's freedom to pursue
collective ends." Mahoney, Common Law, supra note 10, at 511 (citing FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54-70 (1960)); see also Daniel R. Ernst,
The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019,
1020 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)) (describing the "Lochner era" as the era surrounding "the 1905 decision of the United States Supreme
Court that most notably defended 'liberty of contract' from the intrusions of social
legislation"). J. Willard Hurst and his followers "stressed the economic forces influencing American legal policy in the nineteenth century" and recognized a changed
attitude in the twentieth century based on the notion that "unchecked economic aggrandizement had produced many social costs that needed to be paid and that the
expansion of some men's liberty had come at the expense of others' oppression."
Michael E. Parrish, Friedman'sLaw, 112 YALE L.J. 925, 932 (2003) (book review)
(reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(New Haven: Yale University Press 2002)) (citing JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND
THE CONDITIONS

OF FREEDOM

IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY

UNITED

STATES

33-108 (1956)).
15. Morton J. Horwitz, The HistoricalFoundations of Modern Contract Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 917, 917-19 (1974) [hereinafter Horwitz, Historical Foundations].
Horwitz has been much criticized, even vilified, by other legal scholars. See Robert
W. Gordon, Morton Horwitz and His Critics: A Conflict of Narratives,37 TULSA L.
REV. 915, 918-19 (2002). A.W.B. Simpson's seminal article, The Horwitz Thesis and
the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 600 (1979), challenged Horwitz's
claim that the will theory was a product of the nineteenth century and that the judiciary had been guided by equitable concerns. However, Patrick Atiyah's book, The
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract,supported much of Horwitz's scholarship. P.S.
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). See Gordon, supra
note 15, at 915-27 for an interesting and concise discussion of the philosophical clash
between Horwitz and his peers.
16. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860,
at 167 (1997) [hereinafter HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION].
17. See Horwitz, HistoricalFoundations, supra note 15, at 949.
18. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16, at 167.
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contract. Will theory was readily used to the advantage of employers
in labor contract cases, where courts frequently acquiesced to unjust
terms in labor contracts based on the myth that they were freely bargained.1 9 However, the dogmatic approach to will theory was not applied with equal force to building contracts, for which the courts
allowed recovery on a quantum meruit theory, despite the existence of
a contract with express terms.2 ° This bifurcation evidences the
fledgling class bias of the courts in favor of commercial players. 2 '
Morton Horwitz argues forcefully that courts continue to apply the
old equitable principles when they intentionally choose the parties
who will receive their beneficence.2 2
III.

PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF

THE PUBLIC GOOD

Modern contract law has grown out of, and is largely reflective of,
the nineteenth century sea change in the courts-the abandonment of
equity as a fundamental component in analyzing contract claims in
favor of the enforcement of business contracts based solely on promise for a promise and sufficient consideration.2 3 Rarely will courts
consider the inherent fairness of a transaction. More typically, courts
enforce one-sided bargains if evidence shows they were freely entered, particularly in the commercial context where true assent is ,not
always requisite to enforcement.
Section A examines the extent to which courts are willing to forego
formalistic rules of contracting to enforce commercial contracts in the
commercial context, particularly in the context of adhesion contracts
involving disparities in bargaining power and limited assent to boilerplate terms. To illustrate this point, the Author focuses primarily on
the enforcement of shrink-wrap, click-wrap and browse-wrap licenses,
as well as the special flexibility of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code when it comes to commercial contracts. Section B explores
the unintended effects of rigorous enforcement of commercial contracts on third parties, consumers, the environment, and communities,
and the law's lack of real concern for such negative externalities. By
way of illustration, Section B discusses the prioritization of commer19. See id. at 186-87. For example, in Coolidge v. Puaaiki, 3 Haw. 810, 810, 814
(1877), rather than inquire into the unjust terms of a plantation worker's contract, the
court assumed it was freely bargained for, based on the parties' signatures. The court,
in willfully ignoring the realities of plantation laborers' bargaining power, stated, "If
they wished to confine themselves to any particular kind of labor, they should have
themselves caused it to have been designated in their contract .... " Id. at 814. The
court upheld the contract, although it was the plantation owner's wife who had signed
the instrument. Id.
20. Horwitz, HistoricalFoundations,supra note 15, at 954.
21. Id. at 955.
22. Id. at 955-56.
23. Id. at 917-19.
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cial players' interests over the public's right to fair use of copyrighted

material when the two conflict.
A.

Flexibility of Contract Rules in the Commercial Context

Courts have typically been enthusiastic about upholding private exchanges to protect commerce, the business community, and the efficiency of the marketplace.2 4 Underlying this practice is the belief that

legal enforcement of voluntary exchanges is "essential to the smooth
functioning of the economic system,"2 in that "a legal system that
enforces contracts reliably and efficiently plays an important role in
economic growth."26 Commercial contracts have taken on particular
importance, especially since the development of the Uniform Commercial Code, which identifies a primary goal of fostering the "continued expansion of commercial practices." 27 Market efficiency and the
protection of industry have also been used to justify the enforcement
of standard adhesion contracts, including shrink-wrap, click-wrap,

web-wrap, and browse-wrap license agreements.28 The purpose of
this Section is not to tackle the question of whether mass market license agreements should be enforceable. Rather, in this Section the
Author considers the courts' willingness to enforce commercial contracts as a meter against which to evaluate how courts handle third
party interests and contracts for the public interest.

24. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 8-9
(3d ed. 1987) (putting forth the theory that "contract law is based upon the needs of
trade, sometimes stated in terms of the mutual advantage of the contracting parties,
but more often of late in terms of a tool of the economic and social order"); Hadfield,
supra note 12, at 1 (stating that "the problem of enforcing agreements in exchange is
at the heart of economic life").
25. Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Law and Macroeconomics, 6 VA. J. 72, 81 (2003)
[hereinafter Mahoney, Macroeconomics];see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 558 (2003) (explaining that "[s]ociety is . . . better off when it adopts laws that improve market
functioning").
26. Mahoney, Macroeconomics, supra note 25, at 80; see also Hadfield, supra note
12, at 2 (stating that "the effectiveness of contract law is critical to the growth of
economic activity"); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 25, at 548 (stating that "a good
contract law is a necessary condition for a modern commercial economy"). Contract
enforcement affects the larger economy, in that "countries that enforce property
rights and contracts experience more rapid economic growth than those that do not."
Mahoney, Macroeconomics, supra note 25, at 77. Furthermore, enforcement of contracts has "regularly accompanied the rise of long-distance trade among strangers."
Mahoney, Macroeconomics, supra note 25, at 78.
27. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b). With the advent of the U.C.C. in the 1960s, the law saw
a shift away from the old "I-sell-my-horse-or-manner-to-you" paradigm toward
greater emphasis on commerce.
28. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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1. Efficiency of Standardization: Enforcement of Adhesion
Contracts Regardless of True Assent
The prototypical example of courts' predisposition to uphold less
than perfectly bargained-for contracts to protect commerce is the adhesion contract. Adhesion contracts are standardized contract forms
drafted by one party who usually has superior power in the bargaining
process.2 9 Generally, the other party must accept the terms as written
or walk away from the transaction. 30 The take-it-or-leave-it terms
most often favor the drafting party, 31 and the party with the weaker
bargaining position often has no opportunity to shop around for better terms, either because better terms are not available with competitors or because there are no competitors. 32 Typically, the consumer
has no time or inclination to read the contract and no opportunity to
negotiate for more favorable terms.33 Even if given the time to read
the contract, most consumers will not do so, assuming that they would
not understand the legalese34 or that such efforts would be futile because they have no power to change the terms.3 5 Accordingly, it is
29. But see infra text accompanying notes 34-35, discussing adhesion contracts between merchants.
30. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983).
31. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts and Democratic Control
of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (arguing that with form adhesion contracts business parties are tempted to impose one-sided and unfair provisions); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 233, 251 (2002); Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the
Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 319, 326 (1999) (noting that "[t]here are inherent evils associated with standardization since it provides the means for one party to impose terms on the other unknowing, or resisting, party"); Sierra D. Sterkin, Comment, Challenging Adhesion
Contracts in California:A Consumer's Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 323
(2004) (arguing that "consumers need judicial protection from oppressive contractual
terms" often found in adhesion contracts).
32. James V. Jordan & Judith B. Gitterman, Franchise Agreements: Contracts of
Adhesion?, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 1, 15 (1996).
33. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1993); Robert
Prentice, Contract-BasedDefenses in Securities Fraud Litigation:A BehavioralAnalysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 382 (2003); White & Mansfield, supra note 31, at 233.
34. See generally Meyerson, supra note 33, at 1270 (explaining that consumers
generally "lack the legal background to understand the subordinate clauses" of contracts they sign); Rakoff, supra note 30, at 1179 (stating that "the adhering party is in
practice unlikely to have read the standard terms before signing the document and is
unlikely to have understood them if he has read them"); White & Mansfield, supra
note 31, at 242 (discussing literacy research which suggests that most consumers are
unlikely to understand critical information on consumer contracts).
35. Daniel R. Cahoy, Oasis or Mirage?: Efficient Breach as a Relief to the Burden
of ContractualRecapture of Patent and Copyright Limitations, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
135, 158 (2003) (noting that "the non-drafting party is generally given no information
on how or with whom a renegotiation could take place (or that it is even an option)");
Meyerson, supra note 33, at 1270 (explaining that consumers often conclude that
"there is little to be gained from reading a non-negotiable contract"); Rakoff, supra
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commonplace for consumers to be held to contract terms they never
knew existed.
Adhesion contracts are also enforceable against businesses, which
are also routinely stuck with terms they did not know about. The classic example arises in situations in which commercial buyers and sellers
each use their own pre-printed standardized forms. Under section 2207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, such contracts are enforceable,
even where the terms in the seller's acknowledgement form are different from the terms in the buyer's purchase order, as long as the bargained-for terms agree.36 This rule accounts for the fact that, most

often, the boilerplate terms in the buyer's form are different from the
boilerplate terms in the seller's form, but the parties still agreed on the
primary terms and still intended to proceed with the contract.3 7 In

these cases, the Uniform Commercial Code has no requirements for
"assent" to the boilerplate terms, no matter who the parties are.
Despite the frequent lack of true assent to vital terms in adhesion
contracts, these contracts have become the backbone of modern contracting because of their efficiency and predictability. Adhesion con-

tracts are beneficial to both businesses and consumers.
Standardization of terms "reduces transaction costs.., and stabilize[s]

the incidents of doing business, ' 38 thereby saving both the buyer and
seller money.3 9 Businesses prefer uniformity in transactions and a
quick and smooth flow of business.40 Consumers are also unlikely to
benefit from having to negotiate each and every consumer transaction
in the marketplace, as a "close reading" of standard form contracts at

the time of purchase "seems grossly arduous."4 1 As explained in com-

note 30, at 1229 (stating that "even the individual who reads and understands is, and
may well perceive himself to be, essentially helpless"); White & Mansfield, supra note
31, at 233. According to the Restatement, "employees regularly using a form often
have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary them."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981).
36. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1994).
37. See id. at cmt. 1 ("Often the seller's form contains terms different from or
additional to those set forth in the buyer's form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed
with the transaction.").
38. Rakoff, supra note 30, at 1221.
39. Id. at 1222. Professor Rakoff explains that standardization "promote[s] efficiency" and "make[s] it possible to process transactions as a matter of routine." Id. at
1222; see also Goodman, supra note 31, at 325 (noting that "[s]ince the forms can be
customized, operations are simplified and costs reduced to the advantage of all
concerned").
40. Sterkin, supra note 31, at 292 (noting that "by treating all its customers with
the same 'standard and fixed' manner, a company can act with greater 'efficiency,
simplicity, and stability'" (citations omitted)).
41. Rakoff, supra note 30, at 1226; see also Prentice, supra note 33, at 379 (noting
economists argue that "adhesion contracts are generally necessary in that it is logistically impossible in our commercial world for both parties to negotiate the terms of
each individual contract"); Sterkin, supra note 31, at 287 (noting that "[I1n many situations, negotiating individual contracts with each consumer would be impractical, for
both cost and time considerations").
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ment a of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 211,

"[s]tandardization of agreements serves many of the same functions as
standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a system of

mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill can
be devoted to a class of transactions rather than to details of individual transactions.

'4 2

Over the years, there has been extensive scholarly

debate regarding the fairness of holding a consumer to terms he or she
likely has not read,43 but generally, courts will enforce adhesion contracts unless they are unconscionable or violate public policy."

42.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 211 cmt a (1981). Karl Llewellyn

explained the utility of "form-pad" agreements as follows:
[B]y standardizing terms, and by standardizing even the spot on the form
where any individually dickered term appears, one saves all the time and
skill otherwise needed to dig out and record the meaning of variant language; one makes check-up, totaling, follow-through, etc., into routine operations; one has duplicates (in many colors) available for the administration
of a multidepartment business; and so on more. The content of the standardized terms accumulates experience, it avoids or reduces legal risks and
also confers all kinds of operating leeways and advantages, all without need
of either consulting counsel from instance to instance or of bargaining with
the other parties.
KARL

N.

LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON

LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS

362

(1960).
43. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 33, at 380 (noting that "[i]t is difficult to argue
plausibly that the parties are negotiating to an efficient end when one side does not
negotiate nor, typically, even read the contract before signing it"); Rakoff, supra note
30, at 1190, 1197 (arguing that, with respect to adhesion contracts, "if the presumption
of enforceability is retained, it threatens to continue to generate undesirable results");
Slawson, supra note 31, at 531 (arguing that with form adhesion contracts business
parties are tempted to impose one-sided and unfair provisions); Sterkin, supra note
31, at 323 (arguing that "consumers need judicial protection from oppressive contractual terms" often found in adhesion contracts); White & Mansfield, supra note 31, at
251 (arguing that courts generally still fail to note the realities of consumer transactions, artificially "prop[ing] up the fiction of consumer assent").
44. See, e.g., Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 2004 FED App. 0126P (6th Cir.) (holding
that adhesion contracts are enforceable under Tennessee law unless they are unconscionable); Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that adhesion contracts are enforceable unless they are "unduly oppressive,
unconscionable, or against public policy"); Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229
F.3d 321, 331 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that adhesion contracts are enforceable under
Massachusetts law unless they are unconscionable, unfair, or offend public policy);
Smith, Bucklin & Assocs., Inc. v. Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding
that adhesion contracts are enforceable unless they are unconscionable or violate
public policy). See generally 8 SAMUEL WILLIStON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 18:5 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that adhesion contracts

are generally enforceable absent unconscionability or violation of public policy);
Rakoff, supra note 30, at 1176 (setting forth the general presumption in contract law
that "contracts of adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are prima facie enforceable as
written"); White & Mansfield, supra note 31, at 250-51 (explaining that "the judiciary's response to adhesion contracts ...still is to assume manifestation of assent and
to apply the 'you signed it, you're bound' rule," subject only to "the enforceability
defenses of unconscionability, fraud, and public policy").
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"I accept" Whatever Terms May Be in the Agreement: The
Enforceability of Mass Market License Agreements

While standard adhesion contracts are a market commonplace,
much controversy has surrounded variations in which the buyer not
only lacks bargaining power, but actually lacks access to the terms at
the time of purchase, as with shrink-wrap agreements, or is not likely
to look at the terms or even know about them, as with browse-wrap
agreements.4 5 Despite much scholarly criticism, courts have widely
upheld these types of agreements.4 6

Shrink-wrap licenses, which apply to store-bought software, have
been at the center of much contract debate in recent years. 47 Generally, reference to these license agreements is placed on the outside of

software packaging, but the detailed terms are often placed inside the
package, or they are encoded as part of the set-up of computer pro45. See, e.g., Roger C. Bern, "Terms Later" Contacting: Bad Economics, Bad
Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12
J.L. & POL'Y 641, 641 (2004) (arguing that "'[t]erms later' contracting is bad economics, bad morals, and a bad idea for a uniform law"); Stephen Fraser, Canada-United
States Trade Issues: Back from Purgatory? Why Computer Software "Shrink-Wrap"
Licenses Should Be Laid To Rest, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 233 (1998) (arguing
that "there are few reasons for the continued use of shrink-wrap licenses for computer
software," because "most of the restrictive provisions in these licenses have uses that
are dubious at best"); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contractingin the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 434 (2002) (arguing that
"the existing law governing standard-form contracts [with some refinement] adequately addresses the concerns that electronic standard-form contracts raise"); Jane
M. Rolling, The UCC Under Wraps: Exposing the Need for More Notice to Consumers
of Computer Software with Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COMM. L.J. 197 (1999) (arguing that shrink-wrap licenses go too far to protect commercial interests at the expense
of consumers); Darren C. Baker, Note, Pro CD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality,
Flexibility in Contract Formation, and Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92 N.W.U. L. REV. 379, 410 (1997) (arguing that "[s]tandard
form agreements, in the form of shrinkwraps, are particularly valuable to both vendors and purchasers in the context of the computer software industry and are supported by the practical reality of mass-market software transactions"); Dan Streeter,
Comment, Into Contract's Undiscovered Country: A Defense of Browse-Wrap Licenses, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1363, 1367 (2002) (advocating the enforceability of
mass market license agreements, arguing that "[a]ny unnecessary restrictions on digital contracting could have negative effects on the development of future technologies"); Joseph C. Wang, Case Note, Pro CD v. Zeidenberg and Article 2B: Finally, the
Validation of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 439, 472
(1997) (arguing that "[gliven . . . mass-market licenses are omnipresent in the
software industry, to hold such contracts invalid would be disastrous"); Tarra Zynda,
Note, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.: Preserving Minimum Requirements of
Contract on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 495, 507 (2004) (arguing that mass
market license agreements that do not involve a meaningful exchange, including offer
and acceptance should not be enforced).
46. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
47. See sources cited supra note 43. Shrink-wrap licenses came to be known by
that name because they initially were pre-printed on the outside packaging of the
software. Once the consumer opened the wrapping, she became bound by the terms
of the agreement. Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in Cyberspace Under ESign: "There's a New Sheriff in Town," 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 943, 949 (2002).
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grams. When a consumer uses the product or clicks on the "accept"
button referencing the contract agreement, the purchaser agrees to
the provisions as stated, even though those terms were not accessible
at the time of purchase.4 8 Generally, shrink-wrap licenses are used to
disclaim warranties, limit liability for the breach of warranties, and
prohibit or limit the copying and use of material protected under the
Copyright Act.4 9
Shrink-wrap agreements are problematic to the extent they offend
traditional notions of mutual assent. As with any adhesion contract,
there is no bargaining between the parties, and the consumer is forced
to live with the terms of the contract if he or she wants the product.
The terms are largely favorable to the seller, and the consumer has no
chance to negotiate for better terms. What makes some critics perceive these agreements differently, though, is that the terms themselves are hidden inside the box and are not readily apparent to the
consumer, even if he or she were inclined to read them at the time of
purchase. Although the reality is that consumers agree to terms without reading or understanding them in everyday adhesion contracts,
those terms are usually available, creating at least the appearance of a
bargain. In light of the small likelihood that the average consumer
will read an ordinary adhesion contract, this argument appears to
value form over substance. But the lack of availability of terms is nevertheless unsettling to many.
Judge Easterbrook responded to this concern in the landmark
shrink-wrap case, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,5 ° by explaining that acceptance does not occur at the time of purchase-rather, acceptance
occurs after the consumer has an opportunity to read the terms and to
reject them, but uses the software instead.5 1 Before that point, the
consumer has the right to return the product without being bound by
the terms. Critics point out that such reasoning fails to account for a
retailer with a no-return policy. 52 Additionally, even if the retailer
allows the return, it may not be practical for the consumer to take the
time to return the software, or the consumer may incur a penalty or
costs of postage if she purchased the product over the phone or
Internet.5 3
Less problematic is the click-wrap agreement, which applies to Internet transactions. These agreements generally appear on computer
screens when a user enters a website and attempts to buy a good or
access a service. Click-wrap agreements are less offensive to tradi48.
49.
2B, 52
50.
51.
52.
53.

Dessent, supra note 47, at 951-52.
Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrink-Wrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not
FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 121 (1999).
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1451-53.
Rolling, supra note 45, at 226.
See id.
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tional notions of contract formation and assent because the user is
required to take the affirmative step of clicking on an icon stating "I
agree," indicating assent to the contract terms before obtaining the
good or service. The agreement is unconventional, however, in that
the user never signs a written agreement but rather manifests assent
merely by clicking an icon on a computer screen.
Browse-wrap licenses are of greater concern. Like click-wrap
agreements, the website provides notice of the terms and conditions
for the online sale of goods and services. But the website provides

notice by placing a small print hyperlink on the bottom of the home
page. Although the user is alerted to the location of the terms and
conditions on the website, the user is not required to view the license
or show express assent by clicking on the link or by clicking on an "I
accept" icon. Rather, users typically bind themselves by using the

website or installing the software. Problematically, there is a substantial lack of uniformity among websites regarding how they provide
notice of the agreement,5 4 and in some cases the user may not be
aware of the agreement at all.

Shrink-wrap agreements became prevalent in the computer market
in the early 1980s and other forms of standardized license agreements

followed with the advent of Internet sales. In the software market,

shrink-wrap agreements are considered a "commercial necessity" 55 in
light of the "mass market approach to software.

' 56

Because of the

amount of software purchased on the Internet or by phone, software

developers are not able to negotiate each sale individually, and requiring consumers to sign a contract at the time of sale would "inhibit the
flow of the software into the lucrative commercial market. '57 It
would not be efficient for "consumers ... to read all the restrictions
included with products that are purchased. Nor would it be reasonable to expect a salesperson to spend an exorbitant amount of time
reading the terms to every customer. ' 58 It is widely believed that
54. Various titles of links to the agreement include "user agreement," "conditions
of use," "terms of use," "legal notices," "terms," or other similar language chosen by

the website designer. Drew Brock, Note, Caveat Surfer: Recent Developments in the
Law SurroundingBrowse-Wrap Agreements, and the Future of Consumer Interaction
with Websites, 14 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 227, 230 (2002).

55. Rolling, supra note 45, at 199 (citing Baker, supra note 45 and Wang, supra

note 45).
56. Id. at 211.
57. Id. at 212.

58. Dessent, supra note 47, at 972 (footnote omitted). In justifying the use of
shrink-wrap agreements, the Hill v. Gateway court explained that:
Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal
terms with their products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of
the phone for direct-sales operations such as Gateway's had to read the fourpage statement of terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the
droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. And oral
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standardized license agreements have become an important part of
today's business environment as they "promot[e] predictability in order to facilitate transactions"5 9 and provide a60 useful way to "en-

courage a more prolific business arrangement.
Initially, courts found shrink-wrap licenses invalid on the basis of

lack of assent. 61 Some commentators continue to argue that shrink-

wrap and browse-wrap licenses go too far to protect commercial inter-

ests at the expense of consumers, 62 and Judge Easterbrook's reasoning
in ProCD has been heavily criticized. 63 Nonetheless, many continue
to advocate their use, 64 and since the ProCDcase was decided, shrinkrecitation would not avoid customers' assertions (whether true or feigned)
that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did not remember or
understand it. Writing provides benefits for both sides of commercial transactions. Consumers as a group are better off when vendors skip costly and
ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.
105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
59. Rolling, supra note 45, at 200; see also Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in
the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & Errr. L.J. 491, 571 (1999) (stating that "to better promote the industry,
greater protection of the industry's products are necessary").
60. Dessent, supra note 47, at 972. As the ProCD court pointed out, transactions
in which the consumer receives the terms of a contract after purchasing the product
are common not just in the software industry, but also with the sale of insurance,
airline tickets, concert tickets, and the like. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1451 (7th Cir. 1996). Notably, browse-wrap licenses are becoming more and more
popular, although, unlike shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements, they are used less
out of commercial necessity than convenience. Browse-wrap agreements are usually
used "because of Web-page-layout considerations or perhaps because they are perceived as less intrusive to the user's access to the content." Christina L. Kunz et al.,
Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in ElectronicForm Agreements,
59 Bus. LAW. 279, 280 (2003).
61. Prior to ProCD,the only four cases in which courts dealt with the issue held
shrink-wrap licenses to be unenforceable. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 108 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d
255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759,
766 (D. Ariz. 1993); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D.
Kan. 1989).
62. See, e.g., Rolling, supra note 45, at 199 (arguing that despite the efficiency of
mass-market license agreements, there is a clear need for "equitable balance between
commercial necessity and consumer protection under the UCC").
63. Bern, supra note 45, at 641. Reviewing the broad range of criticism by legal
scholars, Professor Bern states that "terms later" contracts have been described as:
[A] "swashbuckling tour de force that dangerously misinterprets legislation
and precedent," a "real howler" that is "dead wrong" on its interpretation of
section 2-207 of the UCC, a decision that "flies in the face of UCC policy
and precedent," a "detour from traditional U.C.C. analysis" "contrary to
public policy," with analysis that "gets an 'F' as a law exam."
Id. at 642-43 (footnotes omitted). For a list of seventeen law review articles opposing
Judge Easterbrook's reasoning in ProCD and its progeny see id. at 642 n.5.
64. See, e.g., Michel A. Jaccard, Securing Copyright in Transnational Cyberspace:
The Case for Contractingwith PotentialInfringers, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 619,
644-45 (1997); Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Contract and Copyright Are Not at War: A
Reply to "The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand," 87 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1999);
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wrap licenses have been generally enforceable as long as they are not
unconscionable.65 Although judicial support for browse-wrap licenses
66

is less uniform than other types of mass market license agreements,

these licenses have also generally been enforced if the website provides sufficient notice of the license.6 7

3. U.C.C. Flexibility: Reflecting Commercial Norms
Another example of prioritizing the enforcement of commercial
contracts over the need for assent is found in the underlying principles
and rules of the U.C.C. itself. The U.C.C., a realist code,6 8 operates
largely under the premise that "courts should enforce private ordering
arrangements." 6 9 "Drafted by Karl Llewelyn, the UCC is specifically
designed to give greater legal recognition and enforcement to sales

contracts .... 70 In particular, Article 2 was meant to alleviate "the
apparent rigidity and incompatibility [of pre-Code law] with commer-

cial norms"7 1 by adopting "pragmatic rules that reflect
the commercial
' 72
practices that business people actually employ.
Accordingly, the drafters assured that if contracting parties intended to create a contract, courts would find an enforceable contract
even if one or more crucial terms were omitted,7 3 or where the terms
in the acknowledgement were different from or added to the terms in
the purchase order. 4 Under Article 2, it is not necessary to identify
the precise moment a contract was formed in order for it to be enBaker, supra note 45, at 410; Brandon L. Grusd, Note, ContractingBeyond Copyright:
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353 (1997); Jerry David Monroe,
Comment, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: An Emerging Trend in Shrinkwrap Licensing?,
1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143 (1997); Wang, supra note 45, at 472.
65. See generally Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, (N.Y. App. Div.
1998).
66. Kunz et al., supra note 60, at 282-88 (discussing the split outcomes of the four
cases addressing the validity of browse-wrap licenses); see also Zynda, supra note 45,
at 507.
67. See Kunz et al., supra note 60, at 282-88.
68. See John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretationand the Lessons of Llewelyn, 33
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 263, 268-69 (2000). Karl Llewelyn, the principal drafter, believed
that "the meaning of a sales contract depends upon the commercial and historical
context within which it is made and executed." Id.
69. Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 547, 556 (1999).
70. John P. Esser, InstitutionalizingIndustry: The ChangingForms of Contract, 21
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 593, 596 (1996); Rolling, supra note 45, at 204 (noting that "[i]n
general, contracts are easier to form under the UCC").
71. Larry T. Garvin, Credit,Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit
Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247, 263 (1996).
72. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the InstitutionalStructure of
the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 18 (1997); see also Perry, supra note 3, at
543. These default rules "promot[e] predictability in order to facilitate transactions"
and "save[ ] everybody time and money." Rolling, supra note 45, at 200.
73. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1994).
74. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1994).
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forceable, 5 and the acceptance need not be a mirror image of the
offer.7 6
Additionally, although applicable to all sales of goods, Article 2 has
carved out a series of special rules for merchants, many of which protect actual business practices by recognizing and enforcing contracts,
despite some informality or flaws in the bargaining process or the execution of the contract.7 7 For example, section 2-201(2) broadens the
type and content of writings required between merchants to satisfy the
statute of frauds, 78 and section 2-205, which deals with firm offers, allows merchants to create an option that is binding for up to three
months and that only requires a signed writing. 79 To protect market
efficiency, informality and flexibility protect commercial parties from
facing unenforceable contracts when they are contrary to their
intentions.
Default rules with such flexibility generally protect the business
community,8 ° and "stimulate[] and structure[] future commercial
growth.... "81 The U.C.C. has displayed little sympathy for consumer
concerns, focusing its efforts primarily on commercial interests, which
82
have been said to "dominate the the [sic] U.C.C. drafting process.,
Although the Article 2 revision group originally considered more explicit consumer protection to be a priority, after strong opposition
from commercial interests, the drafts with the most progressive pro75. U.C.C. § 2-204(2).
76. U.C.C. § 2-207; see also Rubin, supra note 72, at 18 ("[I]n drafting Article 2,
Llewelyn dispensed with the rule of title, perfect tender, and the mirror image rule for
offer and acceptance, replacing them with flexible provisions for allocating loss, curing defects and enabling the transaction to go forward despite minor disagreements."). Another example can be found in section 2-202, the U.C.C.'s "quite relaxed
version of the parol evidence rule," which permits the introduction of all evidence of
trade usage, course of dealing and course of performance to explain or supplement
the contract, as long as it does not directly contradict the written agreement, and any
consistent additional terms that do not contradict, as long as the contract is not fully
integrated. See Breen, supra note 68, at 269.
77. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2-209, 2-312, 2-314, 2-316(2), 2-327(1)(c), 2402(2), 2-403(2), 2-509(3), 2-603, 2-605, 2-609 (1994). See generally Rustad, supra note
69, at 557 n.72.
78. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1994). Under the merchant's exception, a writing between
merchants satisfies the statute of frauds "if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, . . . unless written notice of objection to
its contents is given within 10 days after it is received." Id.
79. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1994).
80. Rustad, supra note 69, at 557.
81. Rolling, supra note 45, at 202; see also Dessent, supra note 47, at 950 (explaining that the U.C.C. is meant "to do away with many of the old common law conventions that plagued contract law and impeded efficient business transactions").
82. Rubin, supra note 72, at 13. "[A]lthough the UCC was designed for both commercial parties and consumers, in practice the UCC may protect commercial parties
more efficiently because business people are often more likely to be more familiar
with the provisions of the UCC." Rolling, supra note 45, at 225 (footnote omitted).
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tection for consumer interests were abandoned.83 In the end, most
consumer protection clauses considered did not make it into the final

amendments, and the underlying importance of market efficiency has

not been disturbed. 84

Notably, many scholars have pointed out that Article 2's success has

much to do with its attention to and concern for reflecting existing
commercial norms, rather than making any attempts to legislate com-

mercial behavior.8 5 Panelist Courtney Lytle Perry enumerates the
hazards of legislation that attempts to "create law that would pro-

scribe the actions of players in the technology field."8 6 This salient

point solidifies the notion that laws which deviate from protecting

commercial interests and transactions are more likely to lack

legitimacy.
B.

Lack of Regard for the Impact of Private Contracts on
the Public

Section A above illustrates that the rigorous enforcement of con-

tracts is meant to protect the value of promises and foster economic
growth, but such benefits come at a cost. What of the family who lives
above a nightclub and is negatively impacted when patrons contract
with the club to listen to pulsating dance music late at night, or the

impact on the environment when a consumer buys an automobile that

83. Over a decade ago, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) decided to do a major overhaul and update of Article 2, to
"meet the demands of modern commerce." Gregory E. Maggs, The Waning Importance of Revisions to U.C.C. Article 2, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 596 (2003). After more than a dozen, detailed drafts and much controversy, however, the final
amendments approved by NCCUSL on August 5, 2002 included only modest changes
to a few provisions. Id. One of the biggest hurdles faced by the drafting committee
involved consumer protection issues. Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to Symposium
on Proposed Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 787, 792 (2001). According to Professor Speidel, the chair of the revision Study Group, the limited provisions under consideration in the July 1999 draft providing commercial protection were wholly
inadequate to consumer groups, while considered excessive by commercial interests.
Id. He explains that "[tihe Study Group, 'for both conceptual and practical reasons,'
endorsed Article 2's neutral position on consumer protection and was content to
leave these matters to federal and other state law." Id. (quoting PEB Study Group:
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 Bus. LAW. 1869, 1876
(1991) ("Article 2 is 'primarily' a commercial statute, ... the history of consumer
protection laws reflects local, non-uniform development, and . . . a more inclusive
approach would impair the chances for approval and ultimate adoption of any revised
Article 2.")).
84. The drafting committee included additional consumer protection provisions in
the draft and faced strong opposition from commercial interests, which ultimately succeeded in convincing NCCUSL leadership to abandon the 1999 draft altogether.
Speidel, supra note 83, at 792-93.
85. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 3, at 545; see also supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
86. Perry, supra note 3, at 551 (arguing that the UCITA movement's abandonment of Llewellyn's philosophy created great opposition and led to its ultimate
demise).
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emits exhaust? And who considers the person who is offended by
someone else's purchase of garish clothing or a distasteful lawn

jockey? Certainly, some of these unintended consequences are regulated by other areas of the law, 87 and, indeed, other effects are not

necessarily important enough for the law to regulate. 8 But there are
also contract doctrines that purport to internalize the negative impact
of private contract law on the public. For example, the contract defenses of unconscionability, public policy, and capacity purport to
limit enforcement of privately bargained contracts when such enforcement would negatively impact the public good. What I undertake to

show in this Section, however, is that most often, third-party and pub-

lic concerns are not addressed through contract law, and where they
are addressed, the limitation on private autonomy does not always
promote the public interest.
1. The Problem of Externalities
In the courts' eagerness and vigor to enforce contracts to protect
the free flow of goods and services, the direct or indirect effect of such
contracts on third parties and the public is often overlooked. Contract
law, which is generally based on a theory of private autonomy, implicitly recognizes the importance of individual preferences as a fundamental principle of the private ordering.8 9 Presuming that individuals
are better equipped than courts to determine how they value goods
and services, 90 and that people act rationally and in their own self interest, 9 1 courts are loath to impose their view of the fairness of an
exchange on the individual parties.92 However, when individuals act
in furtherance of their individual preferences there are certain inevita-

87. For example, the noise pollution from the nightclub contract is regulated
through zoning laws, as well as the United States Constitution, and the EPA regulates
air pollution resulting from a car purchase.
88. The garish clothing and distasteful lawn jockey may well be sufficiently regulated by public ridicule.
89. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 24, at 8 (explaining that under a theory
of private autonomy, "[r]ecognizing the desirability of allowing individuals to regulate, to a large extent, their own affairs," the State delegates its power to its inhabitants); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 863 (2003) [hereinafter Posner, Economic
Analysis].
90. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 25, at 549 (stating that "firms are better able than
courts or statutory drafters to choose efficient terms and strategies").
91. Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 89, at 865.
92. See id. at 863; Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of
Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1272 (1996);
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 25, at 549 (stating that "the state should let the preferences of firms control because firms can better pursue the objective that both the
state and firms share").
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ble consequences that reach beyond the contracting 93parties to third
parties, the environment, communities, and societies.

When courts enforce private contracts in the name of market efficiency and freedom of contract, and individual maximizing behavior
predominates, there is tension with outlying social relationships and
institutions that may suffer as a result. Professor Trebilcock notes that
sets of values are likely to be "systematically unaddressed or underaddressed in the common law of contracts."94 He explains that mar-

ket economies that fail to consider the wants and needs of each member of the community are not protective of "personal, social, and
community relationships and networks."9' 5 According to Trebilcock,
any theory of contract premised on a private ordering paradigm that
cares about individual autonomy, voluntariness, and consent will
surely lack sensitivity to the social costs to individuals and
communities.9 6
Arguing that efficiency should be contract law's only normative

goal, Professors Schwartz and Scott recognize that in exclusively maximizing profits, firms "sometimes do bad things" that impose costs on
third parties, such as polluting the environment or erecting barriers to

entry. 97 They assert, however, that contract law should not attempt to
regulate these types of behaviors because other areas of the law, such
as environmental and antitrust laws, regulate them. 98 Accordingly,
their analysis of an efficiency theory of contract assumes the absence
of externalities, or rather, disregards possible negative externalities resulting from the exchange.9 9 Other scholars justify non-intervention
by pointing out that, despite the inevitable existence of negative exter-

nalities when parties choose terms that are optimal for themselves,

93. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 29
(1993) ("[Flew transactions have no tangible or intangible impacts on third parties.");
Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 89, at 861 ("When two parties design a contract, they will choose terms that are optimal for themselves; they will not take account of the interests of third parties who might be affected by the contract. But
there are such third parties."). But see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 25, at 555 (arguing that "as a descriptive matter, most commercial contracts affect only the parties to
them").
94. TREBILCOCK, supra note 93, at 22.
95. Id. at 2.

96. See id. at 18 (citing

KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

(1944)).

97. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 25, at 545.
98. Id. at 555.
It is a firm's systematic decisions that may affect third parties in material
ways. For example, a firm may run a factory with disregard for the environment or the rights of its workers. Systematically inefficient or unfair behavior of this kind is subject to legal regulation under the headings of
environmental and employment law.
Id.
99. Id. at 546.
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judicial intervention is impractical because of the lack of information
available to judges.' 0
Nonetheless, there are areas of contact law that do purport to consider the potential negative impact of private contracting on non-consenting third parties, such as the contract defenses of
unconscionability, public policy and capacity. For example, illegal
contracts and contracts that violate public policy are not enforceable:
"not because [courts] desire[ ] to relieve one of the parties to such
an agreement from the obligation that he assumes, but because of
the fact that the making of such an agreement is an injury to the
public, and that the only method by which the law can prevent such
agreements from being made is to refuse to enforce them."''1 1
Similarly, unconscionable contracts are unenforceable not only to protect the party victimized by the dominant party's sharp business practices, but also to protect the public by discouraging sharp business
practices. Courts typically intervene where one party takes advantage
of its superior bargaining position to impose unfair terms on the other
party, often by artificially raising the contract price beyond what
would be justified in a competitive market. The purpose of such intervention is at least in part to protect the public from such oppressive
contracting, and to maintain a competitive market. Likewise, the policy that renders contracts with minors voidable at their option, is
meant not just to protect the improvident minor, but also to discourage crafty sellers from taking advantage of young people.
Judicial intervention in such cases, however, often harms the very
parties such doctrines are intended to protect, and does not always
achieve its public policy goals. 0 2 When courts fail to enforce contracts based on unconscionability, they sometimes cause the stronger
party to pass the burden on to the party the courts are intending to
protect in the form of higher prices. 10 3 For example, in the landmark
unconscionability case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.," 4
the court invalidated a cross-collateralization clause as excessively onerous to consumers, taking away the added "protection" the Walker
Thomas furniture store thought it needed to do business with its low
income customers. The likely result of such judicial intervention is
increased prices and interest rates, if not refusal altogether to serve
that population of un-creditworthy customers. Where that is the case,
requiring better terms actually forces the "protected party" out of the
100. Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 89, at 860-63.
101. Miltenberg & Samton, Inc. v. Mallor, 151 N.Y.S.2d 748, 751 (N.Y. App. Div.
1956) (quoting Coverly v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 85 A.D. 488, 489-91, 83 N.Y.S.
369, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956)).
102. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal,18 J.L.
& ECON. 293, 305-06 (1975).
103. See id. at 313.

104. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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market altogether for those goods, and restricts the availability of
credit for poor people.1"5
Invalidating freely formed contracts for reasons like unconscionability may also foster a "false consciousness" or "better for them" approach that perpetuates stereotypes about poor people and oftentimes
about people of color as well. 10 6 For example, in her article about
teaching the Walker-Thomas case, Professor Spense points out that
the Walker-Thomas court assumed that Williams, the low-income
plaintiff, was relatively uneducated-an assumption she calls "essential to the holding."' 1 7 She suggests that the court actually hurts lowincome consumers "when their decisions depend upon the view that

are weak, uninformed participants in the retail
such consumers
'0 8
marketplace.'

When courts choose not to enforce a contract perceived as violating
public policy, the result is often harm to some countervailing public
policy or policies, which the court perceives as less important. For
example, in In re Baby M, 1 09 the court invalidated a surrogacy contract because of the perceived harm to the child," 0 the biological
mother,"' and the larger society, all harmed by the "sale of a child"

where "profit motive predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction.""' 2 The
tracts are generally used "for
the poor.""' 3 In the process,
pacity for true assent 1 4 and

court also cautioned that surrogacy conthe benefit of the rich at the expense of
the court questioned the surrogate's capaternalistically regulated what should

105. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionabilityand
Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1993).
106. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41
MD. L. REV. 563, 572 (1982).
107. Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 89, 97 (1993). She explains that, "[w]ithout the notion that Williams is relatively uneducated, the court may be reluctant to conclude
that the disputed clause involved the 'oppression and unfair surprise' that the U.C.C.
suggests is a pivotal element of unconscionability." Id. at 97.
108. Id.
109. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
110. Id. at 1246 (pointing to "the settled law that the child's best interests shall
determine custody").
111. Id. at 1247-48 (stating that "[t]he surrogacy contract violates the policy of this
State that the rights of natural parents are equal concerning their child" and that the
contract violates the rights of the mother who is "irrevocably committed before she
knows the strength of her bond with her child").
112. Id. at 1248-49.
113. Id. at 1249.
114. Id. at 1248. The court noted that
[s]he never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly
any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed, and any decision after that, compelled by a pre-existing contractual
commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary.
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arguably be an individual's choice regarding the use of her own body
as an economic resource, ultimately threatening women's, particularly
poor women's, autonomy.11 The public policy defense allows the
court to refuse to enforce a contract that conflicts with public interests
recognized by the court-policies typically grounded in moral values.
In the case of In re Baby M, how the court resolved the surrogacy
issue depended largely on the court's views and assumptions about
procreation, with broad class and gender implications. Certainly society differs widely on these matters. With competing public policy implications, the court cannot guarantee a result "fair" for society.
Finally, the capacity doctrine discourages sellers from entering into
contracts with minors. Using a bright line test of age, this doctrine
makes assumptions about minors that are unrebuttable, yet not always
true. While the capacity doctrine assumes that children are emotionally and intellectually unable to protect their own interests and are
vulnerable to overreaching, other areas of the law such as criminal
law, routinely charge minors as adults with the implicit assumption
that they are responsible for their own actions. 1 16 Studies show that
minors spend billions of dollars of their own money each year and
17
influence how billions of dollars of their parents' money is spent.1
Unconditionally restricting the market activity of this group arguably
is bad for the commercial marketplace, as well as for the individual
freedom of the minors themselves.
Typically, however, external impacts from an exchange are universally tolerated and justified by notions of individual autonomy. For
example, if I buy a car when I formerly did not own one, then "my
purchase may marginally increase pollution in the environment, to the
detriment of other members of the community."1'1 8 Or, "[i]f I buy garish clothing that offends your sense of taste, or engage in unconventional private sexual practices with a partner that offend your sense of
decency, the transactions or interactions involved generate negative
externalities." ' 19 Intervention in these and other similar cases would
bring commerce to a grinding halt and severely limit individuals in
115. The court also ignored the likely consequence to future parties seeking to have
children genetically related to them-greater costs of having to screen potential surrogates more carefully and lower prices paid to the surrogate because her performance would be uncertain. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 426-27 (1992).
116. Until recently, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
death penalty as applied to juveniles sixteen and older. Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty as
applied to juveniles sixteen and older), with Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633 (U.S. Mar.
1, 2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of
the death penalty on offerders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes
were committed).
117. Don Oldenberg, Consummate Consumer; Children's Business; American's $90
Billion-Plus Youth Market, Wash. Post, July 6, 1993, at C5.
118. TREBILCOCK, supra note 93, at 58.
119. Id.
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their freedom to contract. 120 Contract law is ill equipped to recognize
such broad-reaching externalities and makes no claim of trying to deal
with them.
2.

The Intersection of Private Contract and Copyright Law

One area of the law that exemplifies the dichotomy between private
contract and public interest involves copyrights. Upholding private
contracts without regard to the public interest considerations of the
copyright doctrine leads to inherent conflicts. In that arena, panelist
Leah Theriault argues that copyright owners frequently use private
contract law to extend intellectual property rights beyond those rights
granted to them by the Copyright Act.1 21 For example, a copyright
owner may want to prevent generally permissible activities under copyright law, such as reverse engineering of its software program or a
consumer's ability to engage in small amounts of uncompensated "fair
use" copying.1 22 Thus, copyright owners have turned to the private
law of contracts and, specifically, various forms of adhesion contracts,
including shrink-wrap and end-use agreements, to accomplish that
which copyright law will not.1 23 These private arrangements, especially when accomplished through adhesion contracts, cause concern
because they impact the public's right to freely use data, material, and
ideas and, thus, undermine the very purpose of the federal law. Copyright owners, in effect, perform an end run around the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act, using contract law as private legislation to
exact a result contrary to Congress's intent. The use of contract law
120. Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 89, at 58. Even cases where courts
choose to intervene, such as in those involving unconscionability, incapacity or violation of public policy, where arguably the court substitutes its judgment for the judgment of the parties, are often criticized as being paternalistic or harming the very
parties they intend to protect. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 105, at 29-31 (arguing
that when courts require better terms in contracts, "protected" parties are often disadvantaged because the prices of the goods in question are raised and, thus, some
buyers of those goods are forced out of the market altogether); Epstein, supra note
102, at 305-06, 313 (arguing that when courts fail to enforce contracts based on defenses such as duress, fraudulent misrepresentation, and lack of competency, they
sometimes cause more harm than good by causing the stronger parties to pass the
burden, in the form of higher prices, onto the parties whom they are intending to
protect); Craig Horowitz, Comment, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively
Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 950 (1986) (arguing that
invalidating freely formed contracts for unconscionability is paternalistic and "may
foster a 'false consciousness' or 'better for them' approach that actually restricts the
availability of credit for poor people").
121. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996)
(upholding contract limiting use of application program and non-copyrightable
database of telephone directory listings to noncommercial purposes).
122. See David A. Rice, Copyrightand Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 604 (2004) (reverse engineering of computer
programs constitutes fair use under section 107).
123. See id. at 607.
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thus permits commercial players with enough resources to establish
their own rules-in essence, creating a parallel system of law.
The new and invigorated power of contract law as a tool to protect
author rights not otherwise recognized under the Copyright Act is
only possible where courts do not find the preemption clause inviolable. The Federal Circuit Court held in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.'24 that the preemption section of the Copyright Act 12 5 does
not prevent the enforcement of shrink-wrap agreement terms under
state contract law. 12 6 Bowers permits the use of private agreements,
supported by mutual assent and consideration, to protect an author's
rights where, until now, the Copyright Act had chosen to protect the
public's right of access.12 7 Essentially, the Bowers court held that
commercial interests trump those of the public, in direct contradiction
to the rationale underlying the fair use doctrine.1 28 Interestingly, the
court focused on the sanctity of private parties to contract as they
wish.' 29 Such freedom of contract rhetoric suggests the predisposition
of some members of the judiciary to support traditional contract principles even when that doctrine conflicts with other laws and is in opposition to the public good.

IV.

RELUCTANCE OR INABILITY TO ENFORCE CONTRACTS FOR
THE PUBLIC GOOD

A second level of concern arises in the non-commercial context.
Although some courts, a la Judge Easterbrook, appear willing to take
contract law to its outer limits to find enforceable contracts in commercial contexts, there has been substantially less motivation to enforce contracts for the public good. This Section addresses the law's
124. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
125. Section 301(a) provides:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
126. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325-26 (holding that an agreement prohibiting reverse
engineering of a computer program code, an otherwise fair use, is not preempted by
the Copyright Act).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1325.
129. The court stated, "Courts respect freedom of contract and do not lightly set
aside freely-entered agreements." Id. at 1323 (citing Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Mass. 1996)). The court later reiterated
that "no evidence suggests the First Circuit would extend this concept of [preemption
of state law by the Federal Copyright Act] to include private contractual agreements
supported by mutual assent and consideration." Id. at 1325.
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failure to make the same accommodations for contracts with a public
interest component, examining in particular, the lack of consistency in
protecting the public as a third party beneficiary to a government
contract.
A.

Government Contracts: Third Party (Non) Beneficiaries

One way in which the public is protected under contract law is
through third-party claims to government contracts. The test for
bringing a claim as a member of the public injured by the breach of a
contract under third-party beneficiary law is quite narrow, 130 strictly
limiting the number of potential plaintiffs. The process of bringing a
lawsuit in this context can be daunting, particularly for someone with
few resources. In many cases, the legal fee alone may be greater than
the amount at issue, or the amount of recovery expected per person in
a class action suit is too low. For these reasons, the public rarely
brings claims.
Originally, persons other than the contracting parties had no right
at law to enforce the terms of a contract because they lacked privity,
1 31
had given no consideration, and had no mutuality of obligation.
This maxim held sway until 1859, when Lawrence v. Fox132 was decided and courts began to grant third-party standing with some regularity.1 33 In 1932, the First Restatement of Contracts memorialized
this judicially-created concept of third-party standing, thereby granting enforceable rights to certain third parties even though they were
never a party to the contract.13 4 Under the Restatement of Contracts,
section 133, a claimant could achieve third-party status if she showed
that she was a creditor or donee beneficiary. 3 5
The test for whether a third party has standing to enforce a government contract has always been more rigorous because the government
contracts on behalf of its citizens for the public good, and, thus, everyone is a potential beneficiary. The current rule for third party beneficiary standing when the government is a party to a contract requires
two things: (1) the third party must be an intended beneficiary, such as
where the promisee is the third party's debtor or the promisee in130. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
131. Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise:A Study of the Third Party
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1985).
132. 20 N.Y. 268 (N.Y. 1859).
133. Robert S. Adelson, Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right of Action
Analysis: The Fiction of One Government Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875, 875 n.3 (1985);
Amy M. Reichbach, Note, The Power Behind the Promise: Enforcing No Child Left
Behind To Improve Education, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 667, 689 n.183 (2004).
134. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932) (requiring party to qualify as
either a creditor or donee beneficiary to achieve third party status); Id. § 145 (requiring intent of promisor to compensate members of the public for consequences of performance or failure to perform in order for a non-party to a government contract to
achieve third party status).
135. Id. § 133.
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tended the contract to benefit a third party; and (2) for a promisor to
be liable to a member of the public for consequential damages "(a)
the terms of the promise [must] provide for such liability; or (b) the
promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for damages and a direct action... is consistent with the terms of the contract
and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing
remedies for the breach."' 3 6 It is not enough for a third party to show

that she benefits from a government contract or that the purpose of
the contract was to benefit a third person. Rather, "[t]here must be a
showing of an intent that the promisor shall assume a direct obligation
to the third party."' 3 7 Circumscribing third-party standing to enforce

government contracts protects private parties who contract with the
government from endless litigation.' 3 8

Courts indiscriminately analyze third-party beneficiary claims under
the rigorous rubric of the Restatement of Contracts, section 313, disregarding express provisions limiting its applicability to (1) members
of the public and not a discrete class of individuals; and (2) conse-

quential damages, not specific performance. 1 39 For example, in cases

involving housing, employment, and the environment, in which the
remedy sought is solely specific performance or the value of promised
performance, courts frequently require plaintiffs to meet the requirements of sections 302 and 313, despite direct statutory language limit1 40
ing the applicability of those sections to consequential damages.

This represents both a misreading of the law and, perhaps more importantly, an implied rejection of the underlying rationale of section
313, which was to protect parties who contracted with the government

from potentially bankrupting lawsuits for unforeseen damages not to
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§§ 302, 313(2) (1981).

137. Mont. Bank of Circle, N.A. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 601, 611 (Cl. Ct. 1985).
138. Oppedahl & Larson v. Network Solutions, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (D.
Colo. 1998); see Adelson, supra note 133, at 878-79.
139. Adelson, supra note 133, at 879 nn.21 & 24.
140. See, e.g., Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206
(9th Cir. 1999) (although applying federal common law, relying on section 313 without regard to nature of damages sought where, in a suit on contract between federal
government and private company to manage dam, irrigators presumably sought specific performance); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Father Panik Vill. v. Pierce, 685 F.
Supp. 316 (D. Conn. 1988) (applying section 145 even though plaintiffs sought specific
performance in the form of a judgment requiring owners to properly maintain premises); Martinez v. Socoma Cos., Inc., 521 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1974) (applying section 145
where plaintiffs, who had been accepted in job training program, were seeking the
value of the promised performance in the form of lost wages and training).
In fact, section 145, the precursor to the Restatement (Second) section 313, "developed out of cases in which the plaintiff sued for consequential damages bearing no
relation to the value of the promised performance" and was meant only "to limit

liability for 'personal injury and property damage arising out of the operations of a
government contractor."' Recent Case, Martinez v. Socoma Cos., Inc., 521 P.2d 841
(Cal. 1974) (en banc), 88 HARV. L. REV. 646, 650 (1975) (quoting 44 ALI Proceedings
331 (1967)).
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provide a loophole for performance.'
Further support of the inapplicability of section 313 to public programs comes from the illustrations accompanying the text of that section,
which primarily concern
142
contracts for services or construction.
The public has struggled to achieve third-party standing in a variety
of public program contexts with varying degrees of success. The difficulty of achieving standing is illustrated in housing cases where courts
are sharply divided over the issue of whether tenants are intended
beneficiaries of contracts between HUD and project owners.14 3 Notably, in this context, lack of standing to bring suit may mean that lowincome families have no recourse when landlords provide inadequate

141. See Adelson, supra note 133, at 879 n.18.
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 cmt. a, illus. 1; cmt. c, illus.
3, 6 (1981); Arthur R. Block, Enforcement of Title VI Compliance Agreements by
Third Party Beneficiaries, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 20 n.62 (1983); Waters, supra
note 131, at 1201-02 (noting that illustrations are a manifestation of what the Restatement drafters had in mind).
143. The split in the circuits is perhaps best illustrated by the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, which decided leading cases on third party beneficiary status in 1981. Compare Perry v. Hous. Auth. of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir. 1981) (rejecting
third-party beneficiary claim under USHA, § 1437d (annual contributions provision)),
with Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1271 (7th Cir. 1981) (interpreting section 1437f
to find that tenants were intended beneficiaries of housing assistance program). Other
courts have since interpreted the United States Housing Act in the context of third
party beneficiary claims. See, e.g., Ashton v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 56, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding tenants are intended beneficiaries of Annual Contribution Contract); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of FatherPanik Vill., 685 F. Supp. at 324 (rejecting Perry and
expressly adopting the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Holbrook). At first blush, it
seems that the divergent outcomes occur because of the difference in how state and
federal law governs. See Zigas v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (applying state law to contract between HUD and project owner); cf. Reiner v. W. Vill. Assocs., 768 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding federal common law
applicable in housing case); Holbrook, 643 F.2d at 1270 n.16. However, it becomes a
negligible factor when the courts repeatedly state that the result would have been the
same under state law. See, e.g., Reiner, 768 F.2d at 33 (holding that the result would
be the same under New York law); Holbrook, 643 F.2d at 1270 n.16 (holding the
result would be the same under Wisconsin law). Thus, standing does not turn on the
issue of federal governmental immunity; rather, the inconsistency in the circuits regarding who is an intended beneficiary is due mainly to a lack of a cohesive and
uniform doctrine concerning third-party-beneficiary law. In direct conflict with Zigas,
the Reiner court held that the statute vesting power to enforce the contract in the
HUD Secretary established the exclusive remedy under the National Housing Act.
Reiner, 768 F.2d at 33-34. The contradictory holdings in housing cases stems from the
courts's intent analyses. There appear to be two camps: those who require explicit
language describing the intended beneficiary and those, like Zigas, which look to the
purpose of the legislation or the contract. Compare Perry, 664 F.2d at 1213 (holding
that the primary purpose of sections 1441 and 1437d of USHA was to assist the states;
secondarily, it was to help low income families whom the states would assist, rendering tenants incidental beneficiaries), with Holbrook, 643 F.2d at 1271 ("If the tenants
are not the primary beneficiaries of a program designed to provide housing assistance
payments to low income families, the legitimacy of the multi-billion dollar Section 8
program is placed in grave doubt.").
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or unsafe housing.14 4 Contract law is particularly inadequate in these
types of situations, especially where a statutory scheme seems to vest
sole discretion in the federal government to enforce government contracts. 4 5 Because the government is the only party that can enforce a
contract on behalf of the public, the government's failure to act is particularly devastating, rendering this "exceptional privilege" a chimera.1 46 Consequently, the public is forced to rely on the federal
government to seek redress, thereby creating a substantial burden
both on the government, which must decide which contracts to litigate, and on the public, which suffers the consequences when a contracting party breaches.
B.

Wetlands Contracts: Private Development and the Enforcement
of Replacement Guarantees
Contracts between developers and the government involving the
nation's wetlands are a paradigmatic example of the failure of both
the government and the judiciary to enforce private contracts meant
to benefit the public. Panelist Professor Irma Russell discusses the
interplay between laws developed for the protection of wetlands and
private development of those lands. 14 7 When developers plan developments in wetland areas it is often necessary to dredge and fill the
wetland. To do so, The Clean Water Act requires the developer to
obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps"). 4 8
As part of the permit process, a developer enters into a contract with
the Corps, in which she promises to create replacement wetlands to
prevent their net loss. Because of the vital role wetlands play, the
Corps requires this promise before it issues a permit for development,
even when the developer owns the wetlands areas.1 49 Although the
original promisee is the Corps, the developer's promise runs to the
public, who is the true beneficiary. The Corps's goal is to use private
contract law to bind developers to the promise of safeguarding wet144. The HUD grievance process does provide a remedy for aggrieved tenants;
however, it is cumbersome and lengthy. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50-.57 (2004). A complainant must first file a grievance orally or in writing to the local PHA and go
through an informal settlement procedure. Id. § 966.55(d). Then the complainant
must obtain a formal hearing if he or she is not satisfied with the recommended disposition. Id. § 966.54. Only after a hearing may a tenant seek judicial review of the
hearing panel's decision. Id. § 966.57(c). The court in Samuels v. Districtof Columbia,
770 F.2d 184, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1985), recognized the historical inaction of PHAs in not
providing an appropriate and effective grievance procedure for tenants, and, therefore, held such claims could be brought under section 1983 for systemic failure on the
part of a PHA to not enforce provisions of the Housing Act. See also Michael D.
Weiss & Lauri Thanheiser, Helter Shelter: The [Dis]organizationof Public Housing
Policy, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 189, 232 (1997).
145. See supra note 141 discussing the Reiner case.
146. Chancellor Manor v. United States, 331 F.3d 891, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
147. Russell, supra note 1, at 576.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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lands; it stands in the shoes of the public in bargaining for replacement
of wetlands used in developing areas near waterways.
In reality, because of the difficulty in jumpstarting a wetland, the
developer oftentimes fails to establish a replacement wetland as promised in its permit plan. 150 The common results are that the public
never receives the benefit of the bargain between the Corps and a
developer, and the protective environmental policies fail in practice
because the Corps does not enforce the contract. Lawsuits are uncommon because concerned parties believe they lack standing to seek
This problem exemplifies the limitations of
redress for the public.'
using the common law in securing the public expectations set forth in
private contracts created by agencies to protect the public.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is not a coincidence that Hadley v. Baxendale, venerated as arguably the most famous case in contract law, is a case involving commercial actors. That is the paradigm of contract law-a series of rules
governing private individuals who engage in commercial ventures. Although in some cases, judges have intervened to protect parties from
overreaching and zealous business people, as well as to refuse the
court's relief when an agreement contravenes current public mores
and beliefs, judicial activism to stretch the boundaries of the definition
of an enforceable agreement seldom extends beyond the borders of
commercial interests.
However, particularly now that we live in a technologically intertwined global village, these discrete agreements sometimes impact
persons, communities, and environments beyond the parties to a contract, constituencies whose interests have frequently been neglected
by the common law of contracts. Just two of many examples, commercial contracts often get priority over fair use provisions in copyright law and third party beneficiary doctrine-in these cases, many
judges are hesitant to enforce the rights of the external parties. When
copyright owners are permitted to circumvent copyright law meant to
protect the public interest, the government contracts on behalf of its
citizens but does not seek enforcement of a breached contract or a
judge dismisses a third party beneficiary claim, society is the ultimate
loser.
Arguably, judicial intervention is not always practical. Negative externalities are inevitable, but most often, they are not addressed
through contract law, as many unintended effects of contracting are
already regulated by other areas of the law, and broader reaching externalities are more typically tolerated. Contract law is often ill
equipped to recognize these more remote externalities, and any at150. Id.

151. Id.
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tempts to do so would undoubtedly result in new unwanted consequences, not the least of which is a limitation to the freedom to
contract. Application of protections for third parties on too broad a
scale, at the expense of freedom of contract, has not always served,
and cannot be guaranteed to serve, a useful function. If courts are to
consider the effects of contracts on third parties, they must realize this
will come at a cost. As seen with the doctrines of unconscionability,
public policy and incapacity, a refusal to enforce contracts negatively
affecting third parties and the public may have effects that work
against the economic interests of the "protected" parties. With better
terms often come higher prices, which may ultimately be passed along
to the consumer. And of course, as Judge Posner so aptly stated, "It is
a detriment, not a benefit to one's
long-run interests not to be able to
152
make a binding commitment.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss contract law as a viable means to protect the public interest. It is not existing contract
doctrine that is hostile to the interests and rights of third parties and
the public. Rather the issue is whether the judiciary will ever privilege
those parties' concerns to the same extent they have traditionally
done so for commercial players. Even if the predominant modus
operandi of contract doctrine has been the protection of economic interests in order to protect the greater market economy, the judiciary
has often been at its best when it champions the rights of less powerful
parties. Should lay people and scholars perceive contract law as a
dead end for the pursuit of noncommercial claims, it will be in danger
of becoming obsolete.
152. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983).

